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We introduce unemployment and endogenous selection of workers into different skill-classes 
in a trade model with two sectors and heterogeneous firms. This allows us to study the 
distributional consequences and the skill-specific unemployment effects of trade 
liberalization. We show that the gains from trade will be distributed very unequally. While 
unskilled workers loose in terms of real wages and employment levels in the skilled labor 
intensive sector, skilled workers loose in terms of real wages and unemployment levels in the 
unskilled labor intensive sector. However, the inequality of workers between sectors is much 
larger for skilled labor than for unskilled labor. On average, unemployment among unskilled 
workers increases when a skill-abundant country opens up to trade. 
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The debate preceding the vote on the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the U.S. House of
Representatives and the U.S. Senate reveals that, of
the 141 anti-NAFTA statements made, 112 were of
the form “NAFTA will destroy jobs” while, of the 219
pro-NAFTA statements made, 199 were of the form
“NAFTA will create jobs.” (Baldwin and Magee, 2000)
What are the eﬀects of trade liberalization? The existence of gains from
trade is one of the core propositions of trade theory. But at the same time
the neoclassical models reveal that there are both winners and losers. While
the Heckscher-Ohlin model emphasizes the role of country factor abundance and
industry factor intensity for factors that are perfectly mobile between sectors, the
Ricardo-Viner model assumes factors that are speciﬁc to sectors.
The distributional consequences of trade liberalization in the Heckscher-Ohlin
model are summarized by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (Stolper and Samuel-
son (1941)). The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem predicts that trade liberalization
will beneﬁt an economy’s relatively abundant factor and harm the economy’s
relatively scarce factor. This statement is true, regardless of where these factors
are employed. The reason is that the factors are fully mobile between sectors.
Restricting the mobility of factors leads to quite diﬀerent conclusions. Assuming
that some factors are speciﬁc to sectors, as the Ricardo-Viner Model does, will
lead to gains for the factors that are tied to the economy’s export sector and
harm those factors that are tied to the economy’s import sector. The reason
is the immobility of factors combined with the fact that only the export sector
expands after trade liberalization. However, there are several limitations when
using these models for actual evaluation of trade policy consequences.
As the quotation at the beginning emphasizes, unemployment is a core issue
in the political and public debate about trade liberalization. Or, as Krugman
(1993) put it: “One thing that both friends and foes of free trade seem to agree
on is that the central issue is employment.” However, the use of frictionless fac-
tor markets in the neoclassical trade models rules out equilibrium unemployment
by assumption. Further, there is no scope for ﬁrm dynamics, which makes it
impossible to account for the empirical evidence that much of the observed real-
location occurs across ﬁrms within industries rather than between industries (see
Attanasio, Pinelopi and Pavcnik (2004) and Levinsohn (1999)).
In this paper we present an alternative model for evaluating trade liberal-
ization. Our model is able to make progress in the discussed limitations of the
traditional models, while it is highlighting the role of the mobility assumption for
the distributional consequences of trade liberalization. The model incorporates
various features in order to capture the most important stylized facts.
1First, we allow for heterogeneous ﬁrms with varying productivities, generating
diﬀerences in ﬁrm sizes and export status. As a consequence, trade liberalization
leads to reallocation of resources not only across industries but also across ﬁrms
within industries. The assumption of heterogeneous ﬁrm sizes and “selection into
export markets”1 are well in line with recent empirical evidence about ﬁrms and
trade (see Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989); Davis and Haltiwanger (1992);
Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999, 2004); Roberts and Tybout (1997); Clerides,
Lach and Tybout (1998); and Bartelsman and Doms (2000)).
Second, we assume search-and-matching frictions in the labor market, lead-
ing to equilibrium unemployment. In order to gather the gains from trade, re-
allocation of resources is necessary to specialize in the comparative advantage
sectors. In this process of reallocation, some workers may lose their jobs. They
have then to undergo a period of active job search, before they hopefully ﬁnd
new employment. The search and matching framework form Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1999), summarized in Pissarides (2000), is a useful framework to capture
the idea that reallocations are associated with fricitions, leading to steady-state
equilibrium unemployment.
Third, we allow for comparative advantages, by considering diﬀerent sectors
and factors. This gives rise to specialization patterns that highlight Heckscher-
Ohlin forces operating not only across industries, but also across ﬁrms within
industries (for recent empirical evidence see Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006)).
Allowing for diﬀerent sectors and factors re-invents the reallocation of resources
across industries as well as changes in relative factor rewards, which is largely
ignored by the recent research on heterogeneous ﬁrms (with a notable excep-
tion given by Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007, henceforth BRS)). Hence, in
the tradition of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, there is mobility of factors between
sectors.
Fourth, the model incorporates an endogenous selection of people to sectors
and skill-classes. We observe a wide spread of diﬀerent skill compositions between
countries. According to OECD (2007), the share of the population attaining the
tertiary level of education can range from 20% for Slovenia to 54% for Canada.
It is common in international trade to assume an exogenously given endowment
of unskilled and skilled workers. However, if one focusses on the reallocation of
resources due to trade liberalization in the long-run, one may want to allow for
the possibility of training. Training leads unskilled workers to upgrade their skills
and may improve their job opportunities by ﬁnding a high-skilled job.
Our model combines features of the models of BRS, Felbermayr and Prat
(2007), Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008), Helpman and Itskhoki (2008),
and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2008a,b). While BRS embed heteroge-
neous ﬁrms in a model of comparative advantage, and hence incorporate ﬁrm
1“Selection into export markets” describes the fact that only the most productive ﬁrms
export to foreign markets, whereas less productive ﬁrms sell there products domestically.
2dynamics, they stick to the assumption of perfect labor markets. Felbermayr
and Prat (2007) and Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008) allow for heteroge-
neous ﬁrms in a one-sector economy and assume matching frictions in the labor
market. Whereas the former paper assumes a closed economy, the latter assumes
two symmetric countries. In the present paper, we combine the comparative
advantages from BRS, i.e., allow for two potentially asymmetric countries with
two sectors and two factors, with the labor market friction in a model with het-
erogeneous ﬁrms as in Felbermayr and Prat (2007) and Felbermayr, Prat and
Schmerer (2008).2 This framework can therefore explain a) why some countries
export more in certain industries than in others, why additionally intra-industry
trade is observed and why some ﬁrms export and others do not and b) allows for
a discussion of the unemployment and skill-composition eﬀects of trade liberal-
ization. Whereas the model of BRS allows to explain the facts mentioned under
a) but not the ones under b), the models allowing for unemployment are able to
explain the trade eﬀects on unemployment, but not the changes in specialization
and skill-composition following trade liberalization.
There are quite a few studies dealing with the unemployment eﬀects of trade
liberalization. A good overview can be found in Davidson and Matusz (2004). We
just want to mention some recent developments in this debate. Egger and Kreick-
emeier (2008a) focus on the selection of workers into high productivity ﬁrms. In
this framework they are able to explain within group inequality. Unemployment
is due to a fair-wage constraint: Workers are not willing to work for a wage they
judge as “unfair.” They conclude, that trade liberalization not only raises unem-
ployment, but also within group wage inequality. Egger and Kreickemeier (2008b)
allow for three choices of an individual: (i) run a ﬁrm, (ii) become self-employed,
(iii) be a worker. In equilibrium, the marginal individual must be indiﬀerent be-
tween these three choices. They then study the eﬀect on income inequality and
unemployment between these groups of workers and show that international trade
increases unemployment, income inequality between entrepreneurs and workers,
and inequality within these two subgroups of individuals. However, in both of
these papers, there is no scope for a comparative advantage of countries, as they
assume only one sector and one factor of production.
Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008a) have many sectors and countries, and
workers that diﬀer by an exogenously given ability, which is randomly distributed.
Workers are perfectly mobile between a homogenous-goods and a diﬀerentiated-
goods sector. While there is a perfect labor market in the former sector, the
latter is subject to search-and-matching frictions on the labor market. One of
their basic results is that even though trade liberalization is welfare improving,
2Felbermayr and Prat (2007) introduce search-frictions in a model with heterogeneous ﬁrms
` a la Melitz (2003) in a closed economy. Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008) build on this
theoretical model and extend it to a symmetric two-country model. As our model deals with two
countries, we will cite Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008) in the subsequent, even though a
lot of the key developments are indeed already presented in Felbermayr and Prat (2007).
3the distribution of wages becomes more unequal and the level of unemployment
is higher in the trade equilibrium than in autarky. Although their model also in-
corporates workers with diﬀering productivities, their approach is very diﬀerent.
In their model the diﬀerences among workers stem from an exogenously given
distribution of ability which cannot be inﬂuenced by the workers. In our model
the workers themselves invest in their human capital. Hence, the training deci-
sion is endogenous and changes in response to trade liberalization. Additionally,
our model features sector- and skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates which allows for
a richer picture of the distributional consequences of trade liberalization. Fur-
thermore, we have got two diﬀerentiated sectors employing both unskilled and
skilled labor and in both sectors search-and-matching frictions occur.
The last paper we want to mention is the one by Felbermayr, Prat and
Schmerer (2008), who introduce search-and-matching unemployment into the
Melitz (2003) framework, and ﬁnd that trade liberalization has a positive ef-
fect on both wages and employment. As Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008)
rely on a model with one sector, one factor and symmetric countries, there is no
scope for comparative advantages. Additionally, the eﬀects of trade liberalization
cannot be diﬀerentiated according to various skill-classes, which is at the heart
of this paper.
Concerning the interaction of mobility and selection the following recent de-
velopments are worth noting. Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1999) assume that
unemployed labor has no tie to any particular sector, since they have no sector-
speciﬁc skills. This implies that the unemployed workers are mobile between
sectors, allowing to apply the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in order to evaluate
the eﬀects of trade liberalization. Hence, unemployed workers gain (loose) from
trade liberalization if that particular type of labor is relatively abundant (scarce)
in the country in question. The welfare eﬀect for employed workers is driven by
a weighted average of Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Vinor eﬀects. If turnover
rates are high, then the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects dominate, while the Ricardo-
Vinor eﬀects dominate if the turnover rates are low. The implication is that,
in industries with high turnover rates, employed workers gain (lose) from trade
liberalization if their type of labor is relatively abundant (scarce) in their coun-
try. However, in industries with low turnover, the welfare of employed workers
is tied to the overall fortunes of the sector in which they are employed (see also
Davidson and Matusz (2004)).
In order to capture a worker’s possibilities to switch between sectors as well
as to upgrade her skills, we allow for two kinds of worker-mobility between the
labor markets. First, workers may switch between the two sectors, and, second,
an unskilled worker may decide to acquire sector-speciﬁc skills to become a skilled
worker. In line with other theoretical papers and empirical evidence3 we assume
3See Davidson and Matusz (2004, page 10); Anderson (2009); Greenaway, Upward and
Wright (2000); and Elliott and Lindley (2006a,b).
4that only unemployed, unskilled workers can switch between the sectors. Typi-
cally, the acquisition of skills leads to a specialization in one sector/profession,
making it harder and much more costly to switch between sectors. Hence, un-
skilled workers are less attached to sectors and therefore more mobile between
the sectors. Restricting the mobility to unemployed workers seems to be realistic,
as employed workers presumably do not have the time and may not see the need
to switch the sector or to invest in training.
The main results of our model can be summarized as follows. Starting from
autarky, trade liberalization leads to an increase in inter-industry trade between
countries, where each country specializes in the sector where it has its comparative
advantage. Comparative advantages stemming from lower training costs lead
to specialization in the production of the skill-intensive good. In accordance
with this specialization, workers migrate from the sector with the comparative
disadvantage to the sector with the comparative advantage. Skilled labor looses in
the import sector and gains in the export sector, both in terms of unemployment
and wages.
The eﬀects for unskilled labor are more equally distributed, because this fac-
tor is more mobile. In general, trade liberalization aﬀects skilled workers more
positively than unskilled workers in the advantaged sector but also more nega-
tively than unskilled workers in the disadvantaged sector. If we take an aggregate
perspective, we may state that the relatively abundant factor gains more from
trade liberalization than the relatively scarce factor both in terms of real wages
and employment levels.
Further decreases in trade costs lead to intra-industry trade between countries
in both sectors. The eﬀects of intra-industry trade occurring in both sectors can
be very diﬀerent from the eﬀects of inter-industry trade, because it increases
competition in both sectors, which leads to high average productivity in both
sectors. This result has the potential to counteract some of the eﬀects described
above. For instance, wages of unskilled workers in the disadvantaged sectors
begin to rise, implying that some of the unskilled workers who migrated to the
advantaged sector due to inter-industry trade will migrate back to the other sector
with the onset of intra-industry trade.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the
theoretical model. Section 3 derives numerical results from a calibration of our
model, leading to predictions on the eﬀect of trade liberalization for all variables.
Section 4 compares our results to the results with perfect labor markets and with-
out training possibilities, i.e., with the predictions obtained from the BRS model.
In section 5 we do some sensitivity analysis, in order to show the qualitative ro-
bustness of our numerical results for various plausible parameter values. The last
section concludes.
52 The Model
Our model features two diﬀerent factors of production (high-skilled and low-
skilled labor) and two diﬀerent sectors, one of them assumed to be skill-intensive.
Furthermore, there is the possibility to export to a second country. Trade is
subject to frictions, modeled in the type of iceberg transport costs. As in Melitz
(2003) ﬁrms are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity, implying that
the least eﬃcient ﬁrms drop out of the market and only the most eﬃcient ﬁrms
take up export.
The labor market is subject to search-and-matching frictions in the style of
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) (see also Pissarides, 2000). This means that a
ﬁrm has to pay a ﬁxed cost to post a vacancy. This vacancy will be ﬁlled with
a certain probability, which depends on the tightness of the labor market, de-
ﬁned as the ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers. We assume that the labor
markets for each sector and for each factor are separated from each other, im-
plying that we have four diﬀerent labor markets. However, we allow for mobility
of workers between sectors and allow unskilled workers to grade up their skills,
hence, become skilled workers.
In the following we will ﬁrst describe the production process, then the labor
market and ﬁnally the entry- and export decision of a ﬁrm.
2.1 Final goods
Assume that there are two countries, a home country and a foreign country,
denoted H and F, respectively. In the following, we state the equations for the
home country. Similar deﬁnitions apply for the foreign country. The utility of
households is made up by the consumption of two goods which are produced by











￿α2 , α1 + α2 = 1, (1)
where CH
i is total consumption of ﬁnal good i in country H, and αi denotes the
income share spend on ﬁnal good i.
Both consumption goods are aggregates of intermediate goods. The produc-























where σ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of
inputs, the measure of the set ΩH
i is the mass MH of available intermediate inputs
4Whenever we use brackets this denotes arguments of functions, hence, f[x] means f as a
function of x.
6in country H, each produced by a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm, and q[ωH
i ]
denotes the quantity available of intermediate input ωH
i . The normalization MH
assures that the rate of unemployment does not decrease with the size of the
economy (see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Egger and Kreickemeier (2008a,b)
or Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008)). Note that aggregate production does
not only have to cover aggregate consumption but also the various costs that
accrue during the production process, so that QH
i ≤ CH
i .5
The price index corresponding to the CES-aggregated good QH





















i ] is the price of a variety ωH
i .
2.2 Intermediate Goods
Based on the utility function given in Equation (1) and the consumption index





















where Y H is total income of country H.
Firms have diﬀerent productivity levels ϕ[ωH
i ]. As every variety of interme-
diate input ωH
i is produced by one ﬁrm, we may also index ﬁrms by ϕH
i . Input
producers have to pay a sunk set-up cost f in order to start production. Beside
the domestic market, intermediate input producers can serve the foreign market
via exports. However, entry into the export markets entails a ﬁxed investment
cost fx. Further, serving customers abroad entails iceberg transportation costs
τ ≥ 1. Hence, we may write the domestic and foreign inverse demand for the








































If a ﬁrm decides to serve domestic and foreign markets, it allocates its output
so as to maximize its total revenues. Equating marginal revenues across markets
yields px[ϕH
i ] = τpd[ϕH
i ] (see Appendix A1).
5Like ﬁxed costs of production and vacancy posting costs, which are all measured in terms
of the aggregate good.
6Note that px[.] is the cif price in the foreign market and qx[.] is the quantity produced for
the foreign market, including the iceberg transport costs.
7The production function of the intermediate-good producers is Cobb-Douglas:
q[ϕ
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i ]) is the number of unskilled (skilled) workers employed by
ﬁrm ϕH
i , and βi denotes the cost share of skilled workers.
Operating revenues of a ﬁrm in country H with productivity ϕH
i from sales
on the domestic (foreign) market are equal to Rd[ϕH















































i ] is an indicator function that takes value one when a ﬁrm in country
H with productivity ϕH
i exports and zero otherwise.
2.3 Vacancy Posting
Firms are subject to labor market frictions of the matching type. They post a
number of vacancies v of which only a certain share m[θ] is ﬁlled. The number of
matches depends negatively on labor market tightness θ = V/U, where V is the
total number of vacancies posted on a speciﬁc labor market and U is the number of
unemployed workers on this labor market. Each period a worker faces a constant
risk of death d. Additionally, with probability φ the match could be resolved due
to exogenous reasons. Assuming independency of the death and exogenous split
probability, the risk of loosing the worker is given by ρ = φ + d − φd. Thus, the
evolution of the stock of workers of a ﬁrm is governed by:
L
H
















Assuming that the costs of posting a vacancy are c (measured in units of the
ﬁnal good), and that the ﬁrm is destroyed with an exogenous probability δ, the





































where r denotes the interest rate, and wH
Li (wH
Si) is the unskilled (skilled) labor
wage rate in industry i in country H.
8The ﬁrm maximizes its value by choosing the number of vacancies posted
subject to its demand, production function and evolution of employment, i.e.















where we have marginal costs on the left-hand side, marginal revenues on the
right-hand side and λH
Li,t+1 (λH
Si,t+1) is the shadow value of employment of un-
skilled (skilled) labor in period t + 1. These shadow values can be determined
using the envelope condition. Additionally employing the steady-state condition











































with s = ρ + δ − ρδ being the rate of job destruction, assuming independency of
the risk of loosing a worker and the exogenous probability of ﬁrm destruction.
2.4 Wages
We assume that every worker individualistically bargains with her employer. As
in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) every worker is treated as the marginal worker, i.e.
as the last worker employed by the ﬁrm. The outcome of the bargaining process































i ]) denotes the asset value of an unskilled (skilled) worker
employed at a ﬁrm with productivity ϕH
i in industry i, while UH
Li (UH
Si) is the
value of an unskilled (skilled) unemployed worker. µ measures the bargaining
power of a worker and belongs to [0,1].
Following the same procedure as Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008) we
get the job-creation conditions (see Appendix A3):
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￿β σ − 1





















￿β−1 σ − 1









9The wage curves are given by:
w
H


























Substituting out the value of unemployment the wage curves become:
w
H




































The equilibrium on the labor market is jointly determined by the wage curve
and the job-creation condition which pin down the wage and the tightness of the
labor market. As in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer
(2008), the assumption that a ﬁrm is bargaining with the marginal worker implies
that the wage of each worker is driven down to her outside option. This in turn
implies that each ﬁrm is paying the same wage, irrespective of its productivity
level. In equilibrium, each ﬁrm employs as many workers as are necessary to
ensure that the marginal value of the last employed worker of the ﬁrm is equal
to the wage.
2.5 Firm Entry and Exit
There is an inﬁnite number of potential ﬁrms which can enter the market after
having paid a ﬁxed and sunk entry cost fE, measured in terms of the ﬁnal con-
sumption good of the sector the ﬁrm wants to enter. Once a ﬁrm has entered
into industry i it will draw its productivity ϕH
i from a known distribution g[ϕH
i ].
The productivity stays the same as long as the ﬁrm exists. Only ﬁrms which
draw a ϕH
i favorable enough to make non-negative proﬁts will start production.
To describe this entry-decision let us deﬁne the per-period proﬁt of a ﬁrm as:
πd[ϕ
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which is revenue minus wage payments, ﬁxed costs and search costs necessary to
replace the ﬁred workers.7 A ﬁrm will decide to start up production whenever its
7Remember that ρ is the separation rate and that m[θ] is the share of vacancies ﬁlled. Hence,
from Equation (8) and employing the steady-state condition LH
i,t+1 = LH
i,t = LH





10productivity exceeds a certain threshold-value ϕ∗H





















id ] and S[ϕ∗H
id ] are the unskilled and skilled labor inputs needed for
domestic production in industry i of the ﬁrm with productivity ϕ∗H
id . At the
beginning of its existence the ﬁrm has to “invest” in its stock of workers, i.e., all
of the workers have to be hired newly.8 The discounted value of future proﬁts
has to be large enough so that a ﬁrm wants to undertake this upfront investment.
Otherwise, the ﬁrm immediately exits. Equivalently to Equation (17), we can





















ix ] and S[ϕ∗H
ix ] are the additional unskilled and skilled labor inputs
needed to produce for the foreign market for a ﬁrm in industry i with productivity
ϕ∗H
ix . πx[ϕ∗H
ix ] is the additional proﬁt from serving the export market, deﬁned
similarly as the proﬁt from serving the local market (see Equation (16)).9 The
proﬁts from serving the foreign market have to be large enough to justify the
extra ﬁxed costs fx. Empirical evidence strongly supports selection into export
markets.10 Hence, we focus on parameter values where only the most productive
ﬁrms export and therefore ϕ∗H
ix > ϕ∗H
id .
Following Melitz (2003), we deﬁne the average productivity of a domestic ﬁrm










































































































8Note that due to the linearity of adjustment costs the work-force immediately jumps to the
optimal value.
9In Appendix A4 we derive the relationship between the zero-proﬁt productivity cut-oﬀ
and the exporting productivity cut-oﬀ.
10For empirical evidence on selection into the export markets, see Bernard and Jensen (1995,
1999, 2004), Roberts and Tybout (1997), and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998).
11where we have the costs of entering a market, measured in units of the ﬁnal
good, on the left-hand side and the expected proﬁts on the right-hand side. The
proﬁts of the ﬁrm are not yet known at the time of the entry-decision because
the productivity level is unknown. With probability 1−G[ϕ∗H
id ] the productivity
will be high enough to make production proﬁtable. With probability 1−G[ϕ∗H
ix ]
the productivity will be high enough so that even exporting is proﬁtable. The
terms in paranthesis indicate how much a ﬁrm will earn in these cases.
Equality in Equation (21) is assured by the entry of new ﬁrms. As long as
average proﬁts exceed the entry cost, new ﬁrms will enter the market, leading to
increased competition and thereby driving down proﬁts until they have reached
the entry cost (and vice versa if proﬁts are too low).














Given the probability of exporting, we can determine the mass of available inter-





As already mentioned above, we assume the existence of four separate labor




















where the parameter ¯ m measures the eﬃciency of the labor market, while γ is the
elasticity of the matching function. The matching function gives the probability
that a vacancy is ﬁlled in dependence of θ, the tightness of the labor market. In
turn, the probability that an unskilled (skilled) worker ﬁnds a job in industry i




Si]). Furthermore, we assume
that workers are born at the same rate as the risk of death d. Newborn workers
have the same distribution of training costs as the older population and can
immediately acquire the speciﬁc skills in order to get skilled workers in one of the
two sectors. Thus, in steady state the number of skilled and unskilled workers in
each sector is stationary and independent of the risk of death.11 In that case, it
is irrelevant why a job has been destroyed (whether the worker or ﬁrm died or
11The reason why we use this formulation with the risk of death is to give an economy the
opportunity to adjust from one steady state to the other even when this is accompanied by a
reduction in the number of skilled workers in one or both sectors.
12whether just the match was destroyed). All that matters is the rate of overall




























































i ) is the total number of unskilled (skilled) workers in sector i in
country H. The left-hand side shows the demand for labor, given by the sum
of the demand of all domestic ﬁrms for domestic and export production. The
right hand side of Equation (25) gives the number of employed workers (from
the supply-side). Note that the total number of unskilled and skilled workers of











We allow for two kinds of worker-mobility between the labor markets. On the
one hand a worker might want to switch between the two sectors, on the other
hand an unskilled worker might want to train to become a skilled worker.12
Considering the movement between the sectors we assume that only unem-
ployed, unskilled workers can switch between the sectors. Typically, the acqui-
sition of skills implies a specialization in one ﬁeld, which clearly restricts the
mobility between one sector and the other. On the other hand, unskilled workers
are much less specialized and thus more mobile between the sectors. This as-
sumption is very much in line with empirical evidence. Greenaway, Upward and
Wright (2000) as well as Elliott and Lindley (2006b) ﬁnd that unskilled workers
are much more mobile than skilled workers. Elliott and Lindley (2006a) conﬁrm
this result and argue that this is due to their signiﬁcant investments in speciﬁc
human capital. One exception is Greenaway, Upward and Wright (2002) who get
the result that skilled workers have higher ﬂow rates. However, their analysis is
restricted to net-ﬂows of workers, while gross-ﬂows are used in the other papers.
Migration costs likely depend on the total number of worker-ﬂows, hence gross-
ﬂows seem to be the more sensible measure for mobility costs (see Greenaway,
Upward and Wright, 2000).13
12Due to our assumption of a positive death rate of people, it may also be the case that the
number of skilled workers between diﬀerent steady-states shrinks.
13Migration costs occur at the individual level. Hence, net-ﬂows would underestimate migra-
tion costs, especially if two-way migration ﬂows between two countries are of similar magnitude.
13Furthermore, an employed worker is not likely to have the time and, maybe
even more importantly, does not see the need to switch the sector. Therefore, we
restrict the mobility between sectors to unemployed, unskilled workers. All this
is in line with the reasoning of Davidson and Matusz (2004, page 10).
We assume that in the long-run there are no mobility costs between the two
sectors. Hence the value of an unskilled, unemployed worker in both sectors needs











For the same reasoning as above, we assume that only an unemployed worker
has the time and motivation to invest in her human capital. After paying a ﬁxed
training cost an unemployed, unskilled worker can become an unemployed, skilled
worker in the same sector. To get an interior solution we assume that workers are
heterogeneous with respect to training costs. Since the workers with the highest
training ability will train ﬁrst, this implies that training costs are increasing in
the number of skilled workers. For simplicity we assume a linear relationship,
hence training costs are given by:
κ[ˆ S
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where ¯ κH (¯ κF) are country speciﬁc constants, implying ∂κ[ˆ SH
i ]/∂ ˆ SH
i > 0 as well
as ∂κ[ˆ SF
i ]/∂ ˆ SF
i > 0.14
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F
i ]. (28)
The marginal worker in country H (F) is just indiﬀerent between training





exactly equal to the costs of training, κ[ˆ SH
i ] (κ[ˆ SF
i ]). Note that Equation (28)
is a steady-state equilibrium condition, implying that in the movement from one
steady state to the other it is also possible that some skilled workers decide to
“degrade” their skills and become unskilled workers.
Figure 1 summarizes our structure concerning the mobility of workers and
gives the indiﬀerence conditions for unemployed, unskilled workers to switch sec-
tors, as well as for unemployed, unskilled workers to invest in her human capital.15
14¯ κH (¯ κF) are used to calibrate the shares of skilled workers in the home (foreign) country.





i + ˆ SH
i
￿
) we can only allow
for three ﬂow-conditions (three more equations). Allowing skilled unemployed workers to switch
sectors, too, would yield us ﬁve equations with four unknowns and thus the model would not
be solvable.
14Figure 1: Mobility Assumptions of Workers
It also illustrates the four separate labor markets and the ﬂows on these markets
between unemployment and employment.
The introduction of the possibility to train and upgrade skills in addition to
the possibility to switch sectors gives rise to new insights concerning the eﬀects
of trade liberalization on training, and hence, the skill-composition of the work-
force. As mentioned in the introduction, the share of the population attaining the
tertiary level of education varies substantially between countries. Even though
the distributional consequences of trade liberalization are one of the core issues in
international trade, the workhorse models in trade, like the Heckscher-Ohlin, the
Ricardo-Viner model as well as new trade theory models, assume that the skill
composition of the workforce is unaﬀected in the pace of trade liberalization. We
want to challenge this view, and explicitly allow for an endogenous skill compo-
sition. It will turn out that the change of the skill composition between sectors
depends strongly on the type of trade, i.e., whether trade is of the inter-industry
or of the intra-industry type.
3 Numerical Results
3.1 Calibration
In order to highlight the interaction of comparative advantages and the endoge-
nous selection of workers to sectors and skill-classes, we assume that sector one
15is skill-intensive relative to sector two in both countries (β1 = 0.8 and β2 = 0.2)
and that consumers in both countries spend a larger share of their income on
ﬁnal goods of sector one (α = 0.7). Further, the home country is assumed to
have better training opportunities, i.e. ¯ κH
i < ¯ κF
i . Speciﬁcally, we choose the
training costs such that the home country has 50% skilled workers, while the
foreign country has only 20% skilled workers. This is in line with data from the
OECD (2007), showing that the share of the population attaining the tertiary
level of education can range from 20% for Slovenia to 54% for Canada.16
The model is calibrated for moderate trade costs τ = 1.3. The elasticity of
substitution σ is set to 3.8. Concerning the ex ante ﬁrm productivity we assume
a Pareto distribution, given by:
g[ϕ
H







where k is the minimum value of productivity (ϕH
i ≥ k), and a > 0 is the
shape parameter that determines the skewness of the Pareto distribution. We set
k = 0.2 and a = 3.4 for both countries and both industries. Both values are the
same as in BRS and Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008). As BRS we choose
ﬁxed entry costs and ﬁxed production costs to be fE = 2 and f = 0.1. The
ﬁxed costs of serving the foreign market are set to fx = 0.193. This implies that
approximately 22% of ﬁrms in sector one of the home country export, which is
in line with Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003).
The probability of ﬁrm-breakdown is set equal to δ = 0.11, implying an annual
gross rate of ﬁrm turnover of 22% as suggested by Bartelsmann, Haltiwanger and
Scarpetta (2004). Based on the estimates of Shimer (2005) we choose the annual
rate of job destruction to be s = 0.41. This implies that the rate of match
separation (including death and idiosyncratic shocks but not ﬁrm-breakdown) is
equal to ρ = 0.3.
Following Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) the elasticity of the matching
function is set equal to 0.5. While Hall (2005) ﬁnds a labor market tightness of
0.5, Shimer (2005) gets a monthly job-ﬁnding rate of 0.45. From Equation (23)
follows that the monthly job-ﬁlling rate has to be 0.9, which in turn implies an
eﬃciency parameter for the matching function of ¯ m = 7.6.
We set the discount rate to r = 0.04, implying a yearly interest rate of 4%.
The replacement rate of unemployment beneﬁts, b, is equal to 0.4, which implies
that workers receive 40% of their wage when becoming unemployed. Both values
are well in line with empirical facts and similar to BRS and Felbermayr, Prat and
Schmerer (2008). Considering the parameter for the bargaining power of workers,
we follow the common practice and set it equal to the elasticity of the matching
16In the sensitivity analysis we show that choosing more equal countries does not change the
qualitative results of the model. Note, that we calibrate the model for unskilled labor in sector
one in the home country. We then use the same parameters for all other markets, except for
the diﬀerences just noted.
16Table 1: Calibration of Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value Source
r Discount rate 0.04 4% annual discount rate
σ Elasticity of Substitution 3.8 BRS
β1 Skilled labor cost share in sector one 0.8 Similar to BRS
β2 Skilled labor cost share in sector two 0.2 Similar to BRS
α Industry one goods income share 0.7 Reﬂects higher income share sector
fE Fixed entry cost 2 BRS
f Fixed cost of production 0.1 BRS
fx Fixed foreign market access costs 0.193 Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003)
δ Rate of ﬁrm exit 0.11 Bartelsmann, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004)
k Minimum value of productivity 0.2 BRS
a Shape of Pareto Distribution 3.4 BRS
b Unemployment beneﬁts 0.4× wage 40% eﬀective replacement rate
µ Bargaining power 0.5 Hosios (1990)
γ Elasticity of matching function 0.5 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
¯ m Eﬃciency of matching function 7.6 Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005)
c Cost of posting a vacancy 0.134 To match θ = 0.5 (Hall, 2005)
ρ Monthly job separation rate 0.3 Shimer (2005)
¯ kH
i Training costs in country H 0.0105 × P H
i Implies 50% skilled workers
¯ kF
i Training costs in country F 0.076 × P F
i Implies 20% skilled workers
τ Iceberg trade costs 1.3 Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
NH = NF Size of population 1000 Size normalization
P H
1 Num´ eraire 1 Normalization
1
7function. Speciﬁcally, we set µ = 0.5. The equality of the bargaining power and
matching function elasticity is known as the “Hosios condition” (Hosios, 1990).
Note, however, that in the present model this condition is not suﬃcient to ensure
an eﬃcient allocation due to the over-hiring externality (see also Felbermayr,
Prat, and Schmerer (2008)).17 Finally, we choose the costs of posting a vacancy
such that the resulting labor market tightness for unskilled workers in sector one
matches the value of 0.5 (see Hall (2005) for empirical evidence). This implies a
value of c = 0.134.
3.2 The Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization
In this section we illustrate the eﬀects of trade liberalization for our baseline
economy. We start out with a τ equal to 5 - which implies that there is almost
no trade at all and hence we refer to it as autarky in the following - and lower
it until it reaches 1, implying free trade. The most important eﬀects of trade
liberalization are summarized in the form of results.
Due to the diﬀerences in training costs between the countries, even under
autarky the two countries do not produce the same sectoral mix of products.
Lower training costs imply that it pays oﬀ for more workers to acquire the skills
necessary to perform a skilled labor job. This leads to an abundance of skilled
workers in the country with lower training costs. Hence, even in autarky the
home country produces more goods in sector one, whereas the foreign country
produces more goods in sector two.
In the following we concentrate on the characterization of the skill-abundant
home country. First, note that wages for skilled labor are ensured to be larger
than wages for unskilled labor due to the training possibilities of unskilled work-
ers. As we assume that sectors diﬀer only with respect to their factor intensities
(speciﬁcally, that sector one is more skilled labor intensive than sector two), this
implies that prices for a variety in sector one are higher. Higher prices lead to
a higher level of wages due to the wage negotiations. Hence, both, skilled and
unskilled workers get higher wages in sector one. Given the full mobility of un-
skilled (unemployed) workers, this leads to movements of unskilled workers to
sector one, until the value of an unemployed unskilled worker is equalized be-
tween sectors. Due to these migration ﬂows, unemployment is higher in sector
one.18 For the less mobile factor, skilled labor, things look a bit diﬀerent. This
factor is generally better oﬀ in the sector with the comparative advantage. The
specialization pattern is summarized in Result 1:
17We take care in all our simulations that the condition given in Appendix A5 is satisﬁed.
In the sensitivity analysis we demonstrate that this does not aﬀect our qualitative results.
18If unemployment did not rise, the value of an unemployed unskilled worker would be lower in
sector two, causing migration from sector two to sector one, thereby driving up unemployment
in sector one (and lowering unemployment in sector two), until the value of an unemployed
unskilled worker is the same in both sectors.



















Country 1, Sector 1
Country 2, Sector 1
Country 1, Sector 2
Country 2, Sector 2
Figure 2: Production per Sector

































Figure 3: Inter-industry Trade
19Result 1 [Specialization]:
As trade costs decrease, inter-industry trade increases and each country specializes
in the sector where it has its comparative advantage, i.e. the country with lower
training costs specializes in the production of the skill-intensive good and vice
versa.
Let us study the eﬀects of trade liberalization on the most important variables
in turn. Going from right to left in Figure 2, we see that each country specializes
increasingly in the sector with its comparative advantage. Hence, lower trade
costs lead to stronger specialization, aggravating the production structure which
is already present in autarky. Speciﬁcally, the home country increases production
in sector one and decreases production in sector two. At the same time the home
country becomes a net-exporter of goods from sector one and a net-importer of
goods from sector two. Inter-industry trade increases considerably when trade
costs are lowered (see Figure 3).19
The increased specialization of countries at lower trade costs is due to the
increased possibility to exchange goods between countries, leading to a more
eﬃcient allocation of factors, which is at the heart of the “gains from trade”. This
increased specialization induces reallocation of workers between sectors, similar to
the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model. However, additionally to this traditional
reallocation of workers, there is an endogenous response of the composition of
the skills of the workforce due to the possibility of training. Both, the mobility
of workers between sectors as well as the mobility of workers between skill-classes
during trade liberalization, is highlighted in Result 2:
Result 2 [Worker Mobility]:
a) As a country specializes in one industry, workers migrate from the sector
with the comparative disadvantage to the sector with the comparative ad-
vantage.
b) As trade costs decrease, the share of skilled workers increases in both coun-
tries.
Figures 4 and 5 show the number of workers per sector and the share of
skilled workers. As the activity in the economy shifts from the comparative
disadvantage industry to the comparative advantage industry this has two distinct
eﬀects on the decisions of workers. On the one hand, unskilled workers move from
the comparative disadvantage industry to the comparative advantage industry.
19The reader might have noticed that specialization and inter-industry trade do not increase
for the whole range of trade costs. Rather, both reach a peak when trade costs are small. The
reason for the decrease of inter-industry trade and specialization lies in the increased importance
of intra-industry trade for low trade costs. We will explain this in more detail further below.




































Figure 4: Workers per Sector
On the other hand, workers in the comparative disadvantage industry ﬁnd it
less proﬁtable to invest in their human capital. Hence, the number of skilled
workers in the comparative disadvantage sector decreases whereas it increases in
the comparative advantage sector. It turns out that the increase of skilled workers
in the comparative advantage industry outweighs the decrease in the comparative
disadvantage industry leading to an increase in the total share of skilled workers.
Note that, even in the unskilled labor abundant foreign country the share of
skilled workers increases when trade costs fall. The reason behind this increase is
the same as for the home country. The increased demand in the unskilled labor
intensive sector makes training in this sector more proﬁtable. Hence, the number
of skilled workers in this sector increases. This increase dominates the decrease
of skilled workers in sector one, leading to an overall increase in the number of
skilled workers.
So far we have described the overall change in the trade patterns and the
resulting sectoral and compositional shifts of labor. Let us now investigate more
closely the distributional consequences of trade liberalization. As the present
model features two skill-groups and two diﬀerent sectors, the trade liberalization
eﬀects can be studied separately for every skill-group in every industry. Result 3
summarizes the main ﬁndings:






































Country 1, Whole Population
Country 2, Whole Population
Country 1, Sector 1
Country 1, Sector 2
Figure 5: Share of Skilled Workers
Result 3 [Disaggregate Labor Market Eﬀects]:
a) For skilled labor (the less mobile factor) the gains from trade are distributed
very unequally, with workers in the comparative disadvantage industry loos-
ing and workers in the comparative advantage industry gaining.
b) For unskilled labor (the more mobile factor) the eﬀects are distributed more
equally. In general, unskilled workers are worse oﬀ than skilled workers in
the comparative advantage industry but better oﬀ than skilled workers in the
comparative disadvantage industry.
The changes in unemployment and wages are mainly determined by three
separate eﬀects, only one of them present in the model of FPS with one sector.
First, trade liberalization increases competition, driving out unproductive ﬁrms
and thereby increasing average productivity. As already noted by FPS, trade
liberalization will increase wages and decrease unemployment through this chan-
nel. Second, the patterns of specialization described above will imply changes in
relative prices. The price in the export sector goes up and price in the import
sector goes down. This will tend to decrease wages and increase unemployment in
the import sector and increase wages and decrease unemployment in the export
sector. On the other hand, we allow for mobility of workers, which is especially
important for unskilled workers. Via this channel, diﬀerences in wages will cause
migration of workers to counteract the eﬀects on unemployment and to change
22the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers used in production. In this way, a rich
and diverse picture of unemployment and wage eﬀects evolves, and it depends
very much on the level of trade costs and the skills of the worker, which eﬀect is
dominating.
Let us ﬁrst look at the eﬀects for skilled labor. As skilled labor is assumed
to be less mobile, the third channel is less important. Again, we concentrate on
the eﬀects of trade liberalization, starting out with high levels of transport costs
and postponing the discussion of low transport costs to further below. Figure
6 demonstrates how trade liberalization aﬀects average productivity in the two
sectors. The increased competition in the export sector drives up average produc-
tivity, while average productivity in the import sector increases only very little,
unless trade costs become small. As discussed above, the increase in average
productivity and the increase in the relative price work in the same direction so
that in the export sector wages of skilled workers increase and unemployment
falls. For skilled workers in the import sector there are two counteracting eﬀects.
Average productivity increases, but this eﬀect is too small to dominate the eﬀect
of the decrease in the relative price. Hence, unemployment of skilled workers
in the import-competing sector increases and wages decrease. This is shown in
Figures 7 and 8.
Let us now focus on the eﬀects for unskilled workers. As for skilled labor, there
is a competition eﬀect and a specialization eﬀect. These two eﬀects would imply
that unskilled workers in the export sector should earn higher wages. However,
looking at Figure 8, we see that this is not the case. The reason lies in the third
channel described above, namely the mobility of unskilled (unemployed) work-
ers. The expansion of the skill intensive sector is accompanied by a movement of
workers into this sector. However, only a few of these workers are good enough
to aﬀord the investment in training. This implies that the share of skilled to
unskilled workers in sector one is going down. Given our Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function, it follows that, ceteris paribus, the marginal product of an unskilled
worker goes down and therefore the wage decreases. Note, however, that the wage
in the import sector decreases even more (due to the drop in the relative price
of this sector), so that there is still an incentive for unskilled workers to move to
sector one. The decrease in the marginal product of unskilled workers also ex-
plains why unemployment among unskilled workers in the export sector is going
up, as shown in Figure 7. But why is unemployment of unskilled workers in the
import sector going down? Again, the explanation is the possibility of unskilled
workers to switch sectors. Unskilled workers are leaving the import-competing
sector, leading to an increase of the prospects of the remaining workers in the
import sector to ﬁnd a job.
Summarizing these results we can say that for skilled labor, the relatively
immobile factor, our model predicts similar outcomes as the Ricardo-Viner model
does for the speciﬁc factors. The factor tied to the export industry gains, while
the factor tied to the import industry looses. However, in the present model




































Figure 6: Average Productivity of Domestic Firms
the gains and losses are not only in terms of real wages, but also in terms of
employment levels.
From Figures 7 and 8 it becomes also clear that the eﬀects for unskilled labor
are distributed more equally between industries. Again, this is due to the higher
mobility of unskilled workers.
In all of the ﬁgures we have seen so far, there is a markable change in ef-
fects once trade costs have become small: The specialization of production is
overturned, the unemployment rates for all factors and all sectors are dropping
and all wages are increasing. All this is explained by the rising importance of
intra-industry trade in sector two. Result 4 summarizes the role of intra-industry
trade:
Result 4 [Intra-industry trade]:
For low trade costs, intra-industry trade improves productivity in the comparative
disadvantage industry and thereby counteracts the eﬀects of inter-industry trade.
As long as trade costs are relatively high, trade is about exploiting compar-
ative advantages - the skill-abundant country exports the skill-intensive good,
whereas the country abundantly endowed with unskilled labor exports the less
skill-intensive good. However, once trade costs have become suﬃciently low, love
for variety becomes more and more important. Consumers generally value the
slightly diﬀerent varieties from the foreign country but for high trade costs these





















































































Figure 8: Real Wages










































Figure 9: Intra-Industry Trade
diﬀerences are not worth exploiting. However, this changes once trade costs are
suﬃciently low, implying that the foreign country’s demand for sector-two-goods
from the home country rises. Although the foreign country can produce these
goods relatively cheaper than the home country, the diﬀering varieties imply that
the foreign country will start exporting them, too.
This increase in exports in sector two has a big impact on competition in
this sector. While the unproductive ﬁrms were well protected as long as trade
was concentrated in sector one, they are now driven out of the market. This
increases average productivity in the sector as can be seen from Figure 6, raises
wages and thus makes the sector more attractive to workers. This eﬀect weakens
the aforementioned specialization trend and can even overturn it when trade
costs become suﬃciently low. In terms of the three separate employment eﬀects,
described further above, intra-industry trade increases productivity and thereby
the importance of the productivity channel. For this reason employment and
wages increase in both sectors and both skill-classes once trade costs are low.
The importance of intra-industry trade is best illustrated in Figure 9, showing
the share of intra-industry trade in total production in the respective sector.
While mainly negligible for relatively high trade costs, there is a sharp increase
in intra-industry trade once trade costs drop below 100%.
So far we have concentrated on the eﬀects of trade liberalization in each of
the two sectors separately. However, in the public debate the focus is very often
on the whole population of unskilled versus skilled workers. Result 5 deals with
this aspect:
26Result 5 [Aggregate Labor Market Eﬀects]:
The relatively abundant factor gains more than the relatively scarce factor, both
in terms of real wages and employment levels.
In Figure 10 we have aggregated the two sectors into averages of the whole
population. For ease of interpretation, the graph is normalized by using the
respective values under autarky. Hence, the graphs show the relative changes as
compared to the situation under autarky.
The ﬁgures show that skilled labor, used intensively in the sector the home
country specializes in, gains, whereas the eﬀects for unskilled labor are ambiguous.
Unskilled labor looses from trade liberalization if we start out with high values of
trade costs. However, once trade barriers have fallen, even unskilled labor gains
from further decreases in trade costs.20 The initial losses in income are very small
and can therefore be compensated by the later gains. Hence under completely
free trade the incomes of low-skilled workers will be higher than under autarky.
However, the picture for unemployment looks a bit diﬀerent. The increase in
unemployment is substantial and reaches up to 10%. The improvements for low
trade costs are not suﬃcient to make up for the initial increases and so even for
zero trade costs the unemployment rate is higher than under autarky.
One distinguishing feature of our model compared to other recent models
dealing with trade liberalization eﬀects on unemployment (see for example Eg-
ger and Kreickemeier (2008a,b), Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008a,b), and
Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008)) is the possibility to study the role of com-
parative advantages. To highlight the importance of comparative advantages, we
run our simulations for diﬀerent values of training costs, which is the source of
comparative advantages in our model. Speciﬁcally, we set the training costs of
the foreign country to the same value as for the home country in the baseline
calibration, i.e. ¯ kH
i = 0.0105 × P H
i and ¯ kF
i = 0.0105 × P F
i , leaving all other pa-
rameters unchanged. Then we increase the training costs of the foreign country
step by step to the value of our baseline calibration (¯ kF
i = 0.076×P F
i ). We then
investigate how the eﬀects of trade liberalization change when diﬀerences in the
training costs increase. To summarize our results, we compare the average wage
and the average unemployment under autarky with the situation in free trade.
Hence, we calculate the percentage change that results from a switch from au-
tarky to free trade for diﬀerent values of training costs. The results for the home
country are illustrated in Figure 11 and summarized in Result 6:
20It should be noted that the result that unskilled labor looses from trade liberalization for
high values of trade costs is sensitive to the calibration of the model. However, the result that
skilled labor in the home country gains more from trade liberalization is robust. For more
details see the section on sensitivity analysis.
































Figure 10: Average Unemployment and Average Wages

































Figure 11: The Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization and Comparative Advantage
28Result 6 [Comparative Advantage]:
The relatively abundant factor is better oﬀ if comparative advantages become
stronger, whereas the relatively scarce factor is worse oﬀ. Stronger comparative
advantages can even change the sign of the eﬀects for unskilled labor concerning
unemployment.
Starting from the left to the right, it gets relatively easier to train in order
to become a skilled worker in the home country. Hence, the home country gets
more and more skill abundant, leading to an increased comparative advantage
in producing good one. The increasing comparative advantage is good news for
skilled labor but not for unskilled labor. While unskilled labor is proﬁting much
more from trade liberalization if there is no comparative advantage (see the left
end of the ﬁgure), the picture changes completely if the comparative advantage
becomes important (at the right end of the ﬁgure). Most remarkable are the
eﬀects for unemployment. Without comparative advantage, trade liberalization
reduces the average unemployment rate of unskilled workers by 15%. However,
this eﬀect becomes smaller for higher degrees of comparative advantage and in
the end unemployment even increases. For skilled labor things are very diﬀerent.
While the unemployment rate is almost unaﬀected, the wage increases are much
larger if the comparative advantage is strong.
The intuition for Result 6 lies in the diﬀering importance of intra- and inter-
industry trade. As summarized in Result 4, intra-industry trade can have very dif-
ferent eﬀects on average productivity and employment than inter-industry trade.
If training-cost diﬀerences are low, countries are very similar, and trade is mainly
intra-industry trade. Increased intra-industry trade leads to an increase of av-
erage productivity and a fall of unemployment in both sectors. If training-cost
diﬀerences are large, inter-industry trade based on the comparative advantages
of countries dominates. In this case unemployment rises for the relatively scarce
factor.
These results may give a theoretical foundation for the large protests of many
people against further trade liberalization. This protest against trade integration
should be larger when it comes to the integration of less developed countries, and
should stem mainly from people with lower levels of education. This is for example
documented in the joint full report of Eurobarometer 61 and CC Eurobarometer
2004.1.21 It states at page B.3: “Overall, in the Union, young people and the most
educated are more inclined to view globalisation as a positive phenomenon for
their country.” In the Flash EB 132/222 on page 31 the answers to the question
“Are you, personally, in favour, of the European Union enlargement?” it says:
“It appears that the longer one spent studying, the more one is in favour of the
enlargement.”
21Publicly available at http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/cceb en.htm.
22Publicly available at http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/ﬂash/ﬂ132 2 en.pdf.
294 Comparison to Bernard, Redding and Schott
As we have seen in the last section, comparative advantages are at the heart if
one wants to understand the fears and the distributional consequences of glob-
alization. However, recent works investigating the distributional consequences
and allowing for unemployment do not allow for comparative advantages due to
factor endowment diﬀerences (see for example Egger and Kreickemeier (2008a,b),
Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008a,b), and Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer
(2008)). BRS is one notable exception that allows for factor endowment driven
comparative advantages in a model with heterogeneous ﬁrms. Hence, we want to
compare our results with the predictions of the model of BRS.
In comparing the results, we ﬁrst have to note that BRS assume a Walrasian
labor market. Hence, there is no scope to study the eﬀects of trade liberalization
for unemployment. Remembering the quote at the beginning, unemployment
seems to be at the focus of public interest when it comes to the evaluation of
trade liberalization. Our model is capable of analyzing unemployment rates, and
the results are shown in Figure 7. Further, we can investigate the impact of trade
liberalization on the welfare of unemployed workers.
Both models, the model of BRS and our suggested model, predict real wage
changes for unskilled and skilled labor in the pace of trade liberalization. Due
to our assumption of separate labor markets, training possibilities of unskilled
workers, and unemployment, our model does not lead to equalization of real
wages across sectors. However, in the model of BRS, following the Heckscher-
Ohlin assumption of perfect labor mobility between sectors, real unskilled and
skilled labor wages between sectors are equalized. Figure 12 shows the changes of
real wages of trade liberalization starting from autarky. Note, that we distinguish
between unskilled and skilled workers and sectors. The main diﬀerence lies in the
fate of skilled workers which (in our suggested model) depends heavily on the
sector where they are employed. Real wages of skilled workers in the export
sector rise, while real wages of skilled workers in the import sector fall. The
reason is that the export sector expands, which is the skill-intensive sector in the
home country. In the model of BRS the real wages of skilled workers increase
heavily in both sectors. The reason is that the home country specializes in sector
one, the skill-intensive sector, leading to a shift of workers form sector two to
sector one. As workers are perfectly mobile, this reallocation takes place as long
as wage diﬀerentials between sectors exist.
Actually, the shift of workers necessary to equalize wages between sectors in
the model of BRS has consequences for several predictions. Most notably is the
large increase in both, inter- and intra-industry trade. Whereas inter-industry
trade is predicted to be 2.5-times larger in free trade in the model of BRS as
compared to our suggested model, intra-industry trade in sector one (two) is
even predicted 3-times (3.5-times) larger than in our results.
Empirically it is well known that the Heckscher-Ohlin model performs poorly












































Unskilled Wage, Sector 1, Suggested Model
Unskilled Wage, Sector 2, Suggested Model
Skilled Wage, Sector 1, Suggested Model
Skilled Wage, Sector 2, Suggested Model
Unskilled Wage, Sector 1 and 2, BRS
Skilled Wage, Sector 1 and 2, BRS
Figure 12: Comparison of Real Wages
(see for an overview Feenstra, 2004, chapter 2). One of the shortcomings is
that implied factor services trade is much smaller than the factor-endowments
predictions. This phenomenon is called “the case of the missing trade” (Treﬂer,
1995). As trade volume predictions in our model are much smaller than the
ones from the BRS model based on the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, considering
separated labor markets and introducing unemployment may provide empirical
guidelines along which the puzzle of the “missing trade” may be solved.23
5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we want to the analyze the qualitative and quantitative impact of
various parameters on the results illustrated above. For brevity, we do not include
ﬁgures in this section. However, all ﬁgures underlying the analysis are available
as a supplement to the paper. As in the BRS- and the Heckscher-Ohlin-model
and as already discussed above, our main results are driven by comparative ad-
vantages between countries. In our case these comparative advantages stem from
diﬀering training technologies. A country which oﬀers its worker better training
possibilities will have more skilled workers and thus a comparative advantage
in the production of skill-intensive goods. It was demonstrated that in such a
23These are by no means the only possibilities to solve the “missing trade” puzzle. Techno-
logical diﬀerences are the prime candidate to make the Heckscher-Ohlin predictions ﬁt the data
and where investigated heavily in the literature (see Feenstra, 2004).
31setup trade liberalization will beneﬁt skilled workers, reducing their unemploy-
ment rates and increasing their wages.
It was also shown that decreasing the role of comparative advantage by low-
ering the diﬀerences in training costs has important implications for the outcome
of the model. Thus it is not very surprising that other parameters, aﬀecting the
importance of comparative advantage have similar consequences. These parame-
ters are the share of skilled workers in production, β, and the importance of the
skill-intensive good in the utility-function, α.
In our baseline calibration we assumed that sector one is skill-intensive with
β1 = 0.8 and that the other sector produces with β2 = 0.2. Reducing the dif-
ference in the β’s by lowering β1 and simultaneously increasing β2 decreases the
importance of comparative advantages because the production technologies of
both sectors become more similar. For skilled labor this has no qualitative eﬀect.
Quantitatively the impact of trade liberalization is somewhat smaller, but skilled
labor is still gaining unambiguously. On the contrary, the losses of unskilled labor
become smaller with the decreasing diﬀerence in the β’s and can even be over-
turned into gains. For the constellation β1 = 0.6 and β2 = 0.4 unskilled labor is,
as skilled labor, unambiguously gaining from trade liberalization, although the
gains are still smaller than the gains for skilled labor.
Very similar are the eﬀects for a decrease of the importance of the skill-
intensive good in the utility function α. Again the results for skilled labor are
only quantitatively aﬀected, but not qualitatively, while for unskilled labor the
losses in wages can be overturned to wage-increases. However, trade liberaliza-
tion initially still increases unemployment of unskilled workers. This increase is
lowered by decreasing the value of α. But even for α = 0.5 unemployment rises
with beginning trade liberalization and only falls for low trade costs and the onset
of intra-industry trade (as in our baseline calibration).
Other key parameters of the model, like the elasticity of substitution σ, the
bargaining power of workers µ and the replacement rate of unemployment beneﬁts
b, only have quantitative impacts on the level of unemployment. However, the
result that trade liberalization initially harms unskilled workers still holds.
6 Conclusions
The question how gains from trade are distributed has a long history in in-
ternational trade. As long as the history is, as diverse are the answers. Two
of the most prominent international trade models, the Heckscher-Ohlin model
and the Ricardo-Viner model, for example, lead to very diﬀerent predictions re-
garding the distributions of trade gains. One of the keys to understand these
diﬀerences is to consider the diﬀerent possibilities to react to changes in the
economic environment. Whereas factors are perfectly mobile between sectors in
the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the Ricardo-Viner model assumes factors that are
32speciﬁc to sectors.
As the possibilities to switch sectors as well as to train oneself seem to be
important mechanisms to respond to trade liberalization, one of our main contri-
butions is to incorporate an endogenous selection of people to sectors and skill-
classes. Speciﬁcally, we propose a model with two factors, two sectors, search
and matching unemployment and endogenous worker ﬂows. Further we allow
for heterogeneous ﬁrms with varying productivities, which copes with the most
recent empirical ﬁndings of varying ﬁrm sizes and export status.
We show that trade liberalization can have very diverse eﬀects for the diﬀerent
skill-classes. As trade costs decrease, a country with a relative advantage in the
training technology will specialize in the production of the skill-intensive good.
Workers will migrate to this sector and invest more in their human capital.
The big winners are the skilled workers in the export sector, while skilled
workers in the import sector loose. In this respect our model replicates the result
of the famous Ricardo-Viner model, which argues that the fate of an immobile
factor will be linked to the fate of the sector where it is employed. Thus, a factor
linked to the export sector will gain, while a factor linked to the import sector
will loose.
On the other hand, the eﬀects for unskilled labor (the more mobile factor)
are much more equally distributed. In line with the Heckscher-Ohlin model, in
the country exporting the skill-intensive good, unskilled labor will suﬀer losses,
leading to an increase of unemployment and a decrease of wages. Only for low
trade costs, intra-industry trade can overturn this result.
These results may help to explain why speciﬁcally people with low education
levels in developed countries fear opening the borders to less developed coun-
tries, whereas higher educated people are generally more in favor of globalization.
Furthermore, our trade volume predictions are much lower than the ones from
comparable models without separated labor markets and unemployment. Hence,
considering disintegrated labor markets and unemployment may be fruitful to
shed further light on the “case of the missing trade”.
One interesting policy conclusion is the importance of training possibilities
for unskilled, unemployed labor. In order to react to increased globalization,
countries may want to encourage people to investigate in their human capital.
Studying diﬀerent policy instruments to encourage and ﬁnance training would
therefore be a fruitful road for further research.
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A1 Derivation of Equation (7) and Equaliza-
tion of Marginal Revenues
To show that px[ϕH
i ] = τpd[ϕH








































Hence, revenues on the domestic and foreign market are given by:
Rd[ϕ
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Now taking partial derivatives with respect to LH






































































i ]) denotes unskilled labor inputs for domestic (foreign) pro-




i ]) denotes skilled labor inputs for domestic (foreign) production of
a ﬁrm in industry i in country H with productivity ϕH
i .
Noting that we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function which is linear
homogeneous, the ratios Sd[ϕH
i ]/Ld[ϕH
i ] and Sx[ϕH
i ]/Lx[ϕH
i ] are equal. Hence, we




































This shows that when ﬁrms want to equalize marginal revenues across markets,
px[ϕH
i ] = τpd[ϕH
i ] immediately follows.
34A2 Derivation of Equation (11)
The envelope condition of the dynamic programming problem is found by dif-
ferentiating the value function (Equation (9)) with respect to the state variables

























































































where s = δ + ρ − ρδ.
Combining Equations (10) and (A7) yields Equation (11).
A3 Derivation of Equations (13) and (14)
To solve the surplus-splitting rule given by Equation (12), notice that the opti-
mality condition (10) does not vary with the level of the control variables vH
Li,vH
Si.











￿′. This steady-state condition and the envelope theorem enable
us to write the FOC as given in Equation (A7).
Reinserting these expressions together with the workers’ gains from employ-
ment, EH
Li[ϕH
i ] − UH
Li = (wH
Li − (r + d)UH
Li)/(r + s) and EH
Si[ϕH




































i + (1 − µ)(r + d)U
H
Si. (A8)
These two equations are linear diﬀerential equations in LH
i and SH
i , respectively.
The solution is given by:
w
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as ﬁrms equate marginal revenues across markets and either employ the marginal
worker for domestic or foreign production.
The job-creation curve is derived by reinserting the revenue function into
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36Plugging in Equation (A10) into Equations (A12) and (A13) directly yields
(13).
Finally, we express the Wage Curves as a function of θH
Li and θH
Si, respectively,
by reinserting (A9) into (A12) and (A13):
w
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Isolating the wage on the left-hand side yields Equation (14).
To substitute out the value of unemployment, note that the value functions






























Si + (1 − s)E
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Si] is an unemployed workers probability to ﬁnd a new job and b are
unemployment beneﬁts. The two equations can be combined to:
(r + d)U
H










Using the wage curve (14) to substitute out wH












Substituting this into Equation (14) yields (15).
A4 Productivity Cut-Oﬀ Relationship
As in BRS, equilibrium revenue in the export market is proportional to that
in the domestic market. However, the relative revenue in the export market
now depends on variable trade costs, and price indices now vary across the two
countries. Hence, relative price indices enter as a determinant of relative revenue
in the export market:
Rx[ϕ
H














The zero-productivity cut-oﬀ above which ﬁrms produce for the domestic
market, ϕ∗H
id , and the costly trade exporting productivity cut-oﬀ, above which
37ﬁrms produce for both the domestic and the export markets, ϕ∗H









ix ] = σfxP
H
i . (A17)
Combining these two equations leads to an equation that links the revenues
of a ﬁrm at the zero-proﬁt productivity cut-oﬀ to those of a ﬁrm at the ex-
porting productivity cut-oﬀ. Further, the relationship between revenues of two










id ]. These two relationships together yield and equi-
























A5 Parameter Restriction for βi/σ/µ
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σ − βiµ + βiσµ − σµ
−(1 − βi)
σ − 1













Thus, in order to ensure that quantities and prices are non-negative, the following
condition has to hold:
1 − βi
σ − 1
σ − βiµ + βiσµ − σµ
− (1 − βi)
σ − 1
σ + βiµ − µ − βiσµ
≥ 0. (A20)
This condition gives a restriction on the possible values that can be simultane-
ously chosen for βi, σ and µ. In our calibration we take care that this restriction
is satisﬁed.
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